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Latin American Connections Among the Drug Trade, Corruption of Military Officers and Public
Officials, and the War Against Leftists: A Summary of the Colombian Case Valdes* In the past
Latin American generals seized power in order to restore order (exterminate "communists"), and
gain control of the state's considerable financial resources. Taking control of government via a
coup was one of the few avenues available to get rich quick for Latin American generals and their
civilian allies appointed to run the public bureaucracies. Since the 1970s, however, the treasuries
of Latin American governments have been in disarray, result of foreign debt, economic stagnation
and severely reduced external capital flows. The state in most countries lacks sufficient financial
resources to provide even minimal levels of traditional public services, much less enrich generals
and their associates. Latin American military leaders have not given up in their search for easy
money. For many officers, the drug trade has replaced the public treasury as their major source
of personal wealth. Recent testimony in congressional hearings indicates that Panamanian Gen.
Manuel Antonio Noriega may have received up to $4 million per month from the Colombian drug
cartel in exchange for access to airstrips, warehouses and other facilities used in shipping narcotics
to the US, and for nearly unlimited access to the country's banks in money laundering operations.
A large portion of the Colombian drug traffickers' earnings have been channeled through 138
Panamanian banks. This practice was made possible in large part because of the country's bank
secrecy laws. In Panama, anyone could establish a secret bank account. For a fee of about $1,000
attorneys would register a corporation with no requirement to identify the company's owners.
There are no regulations in Panama governing the amount of money transferred into and out of
the country. All of the above transactions can occur under a cover of total anonymity. Colombia's
"drug barons" obtain cocaine and marijuana from suppliers in Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Brazil,
Paraguay, and Colombia itself. Bank secrecy laws similar to Panama's apply in Peru, Colombia, and
Bolivia. Colombian, Bolivian and Paraguayan military officers have been known to enjoy working
relationships with cocaine dealers in their own countries. Recently, the US media has reported
numerous allegations concerning Honduran officers and drug trafficking. Rumors occasionally
circulate about involvement in the trade by military and police personnel in Peru, Ecuador, and
Brazil. The actor common to all the abovementioned relationships real or imagined is the Colombian
drug "mafia," also known as the Medellin cartel. Immense wealth and power of Colombia's drug
barons Considering that the Colombian drug mafia supplies about 80% of all cocaine consumed in
the US, reports of its enormous wealth are not surprising. Alan Riding of the New York Times was
told last November that the cartel's annual income from cocaine and marijuana sales is estimated
at nearly $10 billion. According to Colombian government statistics, the drug trade accounted
for $2.8 billion entering the country in 1986. While many Latin American nations in recent years
have experienced net dollar outflows and economic stagnation, Colombia has registered growth
rates of up to 5.5%, and net dollar inflows. On Nov. 15, 1987, the Colombian press reported that
since January the National Bank of the Republic had laundered $1.2 billion generated from cocaine
sales under the rubric of "tourism." The drug cartel sold this quantity of dollars (earned in bogus
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tourism activities) to the government in exchange for Colombian currency. The Colombian drug
mafia is not only extremely wealthy, but also intelligent, well-organized, and disciplined. The
Colombian government simply cannot match the resources the Medellin cartel can bring to bear.
The drug mafia provides officials, the military, police, politicians and others with two options:
collaborate and get paid, or be killed. In Latin American societies characterized by widespread
poverty, opportunities for social, economic and educational advancement are minimal. Thus,
individuals at all levels of society eagerly collaborate with the "narcotraficantes." Drug mafia
inspires corruption and fear throughout Colombian society The drug cartel has inspired corruption
and fear at all levels of Colombian society. Last June the Colombian Supreme Court decided
that an extradition agreement with the US, signed in 1979, was invalid without prior ratification
by the national congress. The legislators refused to endorse the treaty. Evidently, the Supreme
Court judges, out of fear or corruption, or both, had been silenced by the cocaine mafia. Earlier
in the 1980s, certain laywers and prosecutors who refused to be bought or intimidated, attempted
to bring drug traffickers to justice. The drug cartel exacted its revenge. For instance, on April
30, 1984, Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla was murdered, result of his anti-drug trafficking
crusade. The minister's death marked the beginning of a virtual war between the cocaine mafia
and certain non-corruptible officials of the then-ruling Liberal government. The government
responded to the murder by delivering 13 Colombian drug dealers to the US, despite the absence
of an extradition treaty. Among the 13 were the brothers Said and Nayib Pabon Jatter. In turn, the
drug cartel organized a death squad called the Pabon Jatter Commando to revenge the extraditions.
Since 1985 no less than 50 Colombian judges have been murdered by the drug cartel. Some judges
refused to choose between the options of selling their services to the mafia, and living in fear
of assassination. A case in point is Horacio Ramirez, a Bogota criminal court judge, who left the
country because the government could not provide him with 24-hour police protection. Leftists
under attack by military and drug mafia The Colombian police and military have chronically
failed to take adequate measures against the drug mafia. Leftists and grass roots organizations
have been among their most vocal critics, particularly politicians and activists associated with
the Union Patriotica (UP). The UP was established on March 28, 1984 following the declaration
of a cease-fire between the government and the military on the one hand, and on the other, a
major guerrilla organization, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). UP is
described as FARC's political party, created in an attempt to legally participate in national and
local politics. Its policies are usually perceived as reformist in nature. In 1985 and 1986, the UP
gained followers throughout the country, and especially in Bogota. By September 1986 the Union
had organized a labor union confederation, the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT), whose
800,000 members are sympathetic to UP reforms. Many government officials and military officers
consider CUT to be a major political ("security") threat. In September 1986, a guerrilla coalition,
the Coordinadora Guerrillera Simon Bolivar, was created by the Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional
(National Liberation Army), Ejercito Popular de Liberacion (Popular Liberation Army), Partido
Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (Revolutionary Workers Party) and the Organizacion Indigena
Rebelde (Indigenous Rebel Organization). Coordinadora rebels total about 7,000, and their influence
is concentrated in the Colombian countryside. The Colombian military was convinced that the
UP and the Coordinadora had established a working relationship. Accordingly, the generals
claimed the Union was made responsible for subversive activities on the urban front, while the
Coordinadora took charge of similar actions in rural areas. In response to the leftist threat, the
military apparently declared "total war" against the UP, and solicited the assistance of the drug
mafia. In 1986 alone, 11,000 homicides were recorded in Colombia. Between January and late
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October last year, Colombian authorities counted 1,200 political killings. UP politicians claimed that
the vast majority of assassinations were perpetrated against their members, and that the number
of politically-motivated murders was much higher. By mid-November, party spokespersons said
that the death toll of UP leaders was close to 1,000. Included was the UP's president Jaime Pardo
Leal, assassinated in October. In Colombia, the rightist assassination campaign against the UP and
other persons engaged in organizing workers and the poor, is known as the "Condor Plan" (Plan
Condor). According to Union and labor leaders, among others, the campaign was organized by the
military with the assistance of the drug mafia, and has been accelerating since 1986. Violence in
Colombia an everyday phenomenon Partly in response to US pressure toward strengthening its
world-wide anti-drug crusade Colombians have recently appeared to be more willing to publicly
address the problem of violence in their country. In December last year, Defense Minister Gen.
Rafael Zamudio (who is reportedly involved in the drug trade), said that during the first 11 months
of 1987, 324 soldiers and policemen were killed, as well as 574 guerrillas and 220 civilians. On the
following day, the conservative daily El Tiempo (Bogota) reported that civilian deaths numbered
at least 1,018. In the past few months, at least four political or drug-inspired killings per day take
place in Colombia. Further, human rights organizations report large numbers of kidnappings and
disappearances: at least 1,500 persons disappeared in 1987. According to a recent presidential
report, 80% of all political murders in 1987 were carried out by rightwing terrorist groups. At
present, there are 138 of these private paramilitary groups in Colombia. In 1986, their existence
as "self-protection" organizations was legalized (Law No. 48). Death threats against teachers,
politicians, actors and actresses, journalists, musicians, students, labor leaders and religious are
also common. Officially, more than 1,000 persons in the first 11 months of 1987 received threats
from rightwing paramilitary squads or drug dealers. On Nov. 4, 1987, Abel Rodriguez, president
of the Colombian Educators Association, said that over 500 teachers and professors had received
death threats. Meanwhile, he added, the government had failed to take preventative or punitive
action. Rodriguez described the situation as a "holocaust that is bleeding Colombia to death." In
a recent statement to reporters, Alvaro Tirado, special assistant to President Virgilio Barco, said:
"Colombia has become one of the most violent countries in the world: there are assassinations of
all kinds, kidnappings, extortions, disappearances, the takeover of entire towns, terrorist attacks
and death threats on a daily basis." "Sicarios": The drug cartel's private assassins On Nov. 26, 1987,
Gen. Manuel Guerrero Paz told reporters that the drug cartel had created a private army of assassins
known as "sicarios" to maintain control of the trade. He said the sicarios are also used to murder
soldiers, policemen and politicians of all political persuasions. The general's overall description
of the sicarios' targets may be accurate. The majority of political assassination victims, however,
appear to have been leftists or activists dedicated to progressive causes. Most sicarios are teenagers,
ranging in age from 14 to 18. They are typically orphans, have little or no formal education, and
live on the streets. Assassination training is reportedly provided in several "schools" established
by the drug cartel. After their training is completed, the sicarios kill for as little as $70 per victim.
Two years ago, Colombia's Justice Minister was murdered by a 16-year-old sicario. The sicarios are
reportedly recruited in large numbers, and may be found in most Colombian cities and towns. In
the latter half of 1987, Colombian police reportedly arrested at least 500 sicarios. Many Colombians
say they are afraid to go out at night because even the most apparently innocent of activities could
lead to death at the hands of sicarios. For example, on Dec. 19 last year, six persons were killed
in the town of Turbo. They were organizing a Christmas party for young residents of a local slum
district. Witnesses to the killings have thus far refused to testify; no one reportedly knows why the
six were murdered. Colombian authorities' reluctance to act leads to complicity in violence Recent
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behavior by Colombia's highest judicial and law enforcement authorities has hardly contributed
to restoring law and order. In mid-November 1987, Jorge Luis Ochoa Vazquez, the second most
powerful member of the Medellin cartel, was arrested for speeding. (The arrest occurred in Palmira,
Cauca Valley, while Ochoa was driving the car of the Honduran military attache.) Washington
pressured Bogota for the immediate extradition of Ochoa to the US. On Nov. 23, the drug mafia
issued a statement threatening "total war" if authorities were bold enough to extradite Ochoa. The
threat of the consequences of "war" was extended to President Virgilio Barco. On the following
day, the Colombian government decided to postpone Ochoa's extradition until after he served a
standing 20-month prison term. On Dec. 6, President Barco formally announced his administration's
decision that no Colombian citizen would be extradited to the US as long as s/he was subject to
serving time in Colombia. On Dec. 30, Ochoa was released from prison, result of an order signed
by a judge in Medellin. Colombia's Justice Minister acknowledged that the president and other
national officials had not been consulted on Ochoa's release. He reminded critics that the judiciary
was independent from the executive. The judge who signed the release order said Ochoa had served
his sentence; consequently, there was no reason to keep him behind bars. Corruption and fear
have apparently paralyzed the Colombian judicial system. On Dec. 20 last year, Alfredo Vasquez,
president of the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights, summed up the situation as follows:
"Colombia is sinking every day in a sea of criminality without precedent in our history." One of
the few courageous voices within the government was Attorney General Carlos Mauro Hoyos.
On Jan. 4, 1988, Mauro Hoyos urged the Barco administration to arrest and extradite to the US the
leaders of the Medellin cartel. He declared that some politicians had become allies of the drug
traffickers "without taking into account the future consequences" of their actions. The attorney
general also called for the confiscation of the drug lords' property. Colombians were not surprised
that law enforcement authorities could not seem to locate the drug cartel chieftains. Moreover,
the political establishment was loathe to take action in terms of seizing property. Official silence
and inability to act against the drug traffickers have only served to exacerbate the reign of terror
in Colombia. On Jan. 13, 1988, the residence of Pablo Escobar in Medellin was the target of one of
the largest terrorist attacks in Colombian history. Escobar ranks as the top chieftain of the Medellin
cartel. An automobile containing 30 pounds of dynamite was parked in front of the residence. In
the ensuing explosion, Escobar's home was totally demolished, and 12 buildings in the area were
damaged. Two persons were killed, and five wounded. Rather than arresting Escobar, the police had
apparently decided to leave the matter in the hands of terrorists. An organization called "Muerte al
Narcotrafico" claimed responsibility for the attack. Another organization, "War Against the Mafia,"
issued a communique announcing that it had initiated a war against against the drug traffickers
and their allies. Colombian officials said they had no idea of the origin of these organizations and
their members. Cynics argued that the two organizations were probably the creations of other drug
traffickers attempting to move into the Medellin cartel's territory. The drug mafia did not wait long
to respond. On Jan. 25, 1988, sicarios kidnapped and then murdered Attorney General Mauro Hoyo
in Medellin. In a communique sent to the media, the "Pabon Jatter Brothers Commando" claimed
resposibility for the murder. Apparently, the attorney general's most serious error was his call for
confiscation of the drug barons' property. For the wealthy drug lords (many of whom have sizable
investments in Colombian industries), private property is sacred after all. On the following day,
Ramon Anibal, UP mayoral candidate in the city of Cucuta, was murdered alongwith his family
and a few political associates. President Barco soon thereafter issued a decree to "fight terrorism"
in "defense of democracy," thereby establishing a state of siege throughout the country. The new
state of siege one of many in the past decade is not likely to produce an effective attack against the
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drug mafia. Nothing has changed to transform the susceptibility of military officers, politicians,
policemen, judges and other officials to corruption and fear. The drug barons and their corrupted
allies within the government apparatus will continue to amass great fortunes. Individuals who
refuse payoffs will nonetheless behave for fear of their lives. Others, such as leftists and human
rights advocates, continue to live in fear of terror whether from the drug mafia or the military. *
Nelson Valdes is associate professor of sociology at the University of New Mexico, and director of
the Latin America Data Base.
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